-(Timbuktu Institute)
To counter terrorism, the predominance of criminological approaches to the point of inducing states in the region to adopt strictly security-oriented approaches has increased, with analyses focusing more often than not on actors in the “second circle”, such as traffickers, logistical assistance couriers and so on.
Meanwhile, these studies neglect the actors of the first and third circles. The first circle is made up of ideological/community entrepreneurs whose role is fundamental in recruiting, inciting and instrumentalizing grievances.
The third circle, often inaccessible to criminological studies, is that of actors predisposed to extremist violence, or who may ideologically prepare for it. Most often, they interview them in prison or in situations of “remorse”, where numerous biases distort the analysis of real or initial motivations.
What’s more, the tools of the criminological approach are often ill-suited to the subtleties of extremist discourse, with its ideological charge and references requiring deciphering, even exegesis, often beyond the reach of experts lacking the key concepts needed to understand symbols, allusions and language codes.
It is often after the act has been committed that many analysts who deny the ideological dimension gain access to the subjects in question, either in prison or in a situation where the security environment, prison pressure or even criminal actors weigh heavily, thus accentuating the criminological bias despite documentation efforts.
This criminological bias, which has had its full effect on the approach to the phenomenon of radicalization in the Sahel, has not spared certain studies following the spillover of the epicenter of extremist violence to the countries of the Gulf of Guinea. Many of them suffer from the lack of renewal of conceptual tools, as well as the rush to “document” a multidimensional and often diffuse phenomenon in contexts where the gaze is oriented by realities elsewhere.
Moreover, in the face of security and political pressure to develop responses, many analysts must have overlooked the paradigmatic turning point of the accentuation of the communalization of extremist violence, concomitant with the first visible phases of the spillover of the epicenter of terrorism from the central Sahel to the coastal countries of West Africa.
Dr. Bakary Sambe, Director of the Timbuktu Institute, who coordinated the study entitled “Beyond criminality, juvenile perceptions of radicalization and violent extremism in northern Benin”, grants our newspaper this interview to analyze the results and main trends.
The Timbuktu Institute has just published a new study on radicalization in North Benin. What factors lead young people to join violent extremist groups?
This study, based on interviews and long-term observation between 2023 and 2024, focuses specifically on radicalization factors as perceived by young people in northern Benin, and particularly in the departments of Donga, Alibori and Atacora, where radicalization factors are specifically named and explained by local populations.
Thus, young people in the communities participating in this study perceive radicalization and violent extremism, as a whole, as “a refuge from various socio-political, socio-economic and socio-cultural problems”.
Specifically, radicalization factors in Donga are found at the intersection of socio-political grievances, vulnerabilities and clashes of religious models. The latter is reflected in the weight of religion and its instrumentalization, alongside interference and experimentation with preaching strategies between Sunnis and Sufi currents such as the Tijâniyya in a department where 80% of the population is Muslim, and in a context of globalization of belief and transnational connections.
Although still a long way from the epicenter of extremist violence, an analysis of the perceptions gathered from juvenile testimonies reveals the beginnings of a radicalization with multidimensional factors. Wedged between Burkina Faso and the Republic of Niger, the department of Alibori is at the crossroads of local conflicts, border dynamics, land disputes, deteriorating inter-community relations and the offensive of Salafist preachers. Jihadist groups maneuver between these vulnerabilities, fanning the flames of tension between the Fulani and farming communities, whose conflicting relations over access to resources predate the jihadist gangrene from the Sahel, and it goes without saying that they can find fertile ground in this department.
Since the first attacks on Beninese territory, the sometimes systematic arrests of members of this community following “false accusations” have exacerbated tensions between communities, further accelerating radicalization among some young people.
It is precisely into this breach that violent extremist groups, presenting themselves as the protectors of ostracized communities, are rushing.
How important is education in this phenomenon ?
In addition to the duality of the education system, with its contradictory modes of socialization (secular public schools and medersas), there is the much-criticized inadequacy of the education system, which translates into a lack of opportunities after graduation. For many young people, “the training provided in schools and universities does not meet the demands of the job market”.
“The self-employment policies advocated by various governments in response to the issue of youth unemployment have so far remained at the theoretical stage”, remarks one young person, for whom ”the few personal initiatives taken by young people, for want of support, have come up against the realities of the entrepreneurial world.
They end up throwing in the towel. So, any other job offer, legal or illegal, is welcome. The frustrations resulting from the lack of integration of graduates of medersas and “Arab” schools are also an indicator that deserves more attention, so as not to accentuate the vulnerabilities of a social stratum socialized in a system outside the official school as a factory of citizenship.
Who are the recruiters and how do they exploit inter-community tensions and historical conflicts between herders and farmers?In addition to socio-economic vulnerabilities, one of the key factors in radicalization in Alibori is linked to land disputes, according to the testimonies gathered.
Since the dawn of time, Alibori has always been considered the scene of confrontations between the Fulani communities (herders) and the other communities that populate the region”, testifies a young man from Kandi. On average, according to a municipal official, “around a hundred cases of conflict between farmers and herders are recorded across the department every year, resulting in deaths, injuries and agricultural damage”. Tensions are always high between communities opposed by land-related disputes.
In addition to conflicts between farmers and herders, the adoption of new laws on the land and property code in Benin seems to have indirectly further weakened social cohesion. This new law requires landowners to have a land title in order to benefit from full rights of possession. In fact, many rural actors had been working the land for generations without any official documents or title deeds. “The formalization of land ownership led to expropriation,” explains this young farmer.
What is the security response of Benin’s security forces?
On this precise point of response, the testimonies are striking. Despite military action on the ground, terrorist acts continue. Throughout the discussions with these young people from the three northern departments, many insisted on the need for a national policy to prevent radicalization as distinct from counter-terrorism measures, inspired by a security or even criminological approach to a multifaceted phenomenon. “The central authorities favor a purely security-based approach.
The creation of the Haut-Commissariat à la Sédentarisation des Éleveurs (High Commission for the Sedentarization of Breeders) clearly shows that, for the State, the sole aim is to fight the threat militarily. Its logic obscures the preventive and forward-looking approach, which must be complementary to the security approach”, deplores this expert who works closely with youth organizations in the Alibori and Atacora departments. In his view, “we must not turn a blind eye to the ethnocultural dynamics at play.
The State must not persist in a strategy that will only reinforce ethnic targeting, with all the stigmatization already at work”. I believe we need to rethink this approach, moving towards a mixed strategy that will enable us to manage security imperatives as a matter of urgency, but also take into account the underlying causes of the phenomenon, far from the symptomatic treatment inspired by the criminological approach.
Doesn’t the stigmatization of the Fulani community encourage the recruitment of new elements among the young?
That’s exactly what the testimony of this Fulani woman active in conflict prevention shows, “Given that some members of the Fulani community are persecuted by the forces of law and order, they say they’d rather join the jihadists.
There, they would feel safer”. In this particular case, we find a typology of attractive factors in which feelings of insecurity and the desire for protection are combined. It is often in such situations that the security and defense forces become “part of the problem they were trying to solve”, as a teacher from Kérou in the Atacora region testifies.
For her, arbitrary or targeted arrests multiply after each attack, behind which “they always try to see the hand of the Fulani”. The criminological approach that has inspired repressive measures accentuates this temptation to adopt an all-security approach, in the face of the urgent need to implement toolbox responses to a phenomenon that is more than complex.
In the report, you describe how extremist groups paradoxically present themselves as defenders of ostracized communities. Could you come back to this striking aspect of your research?
During our survey, a young member of the Fulani community living in the commune of Matéri testified along these lines: “It was the end of 2022 when they came to our hamlet, they asked us to trust them, no one would be able to expel us from our land and that if they insisted, they would kill them all.
They thought they were defending the Fulani community”. Another young man added: “Some jihadists approached me and asked me to join their ranks because my community (Fulani) is too marginalized and a victim of injustice.
They told me it would be better for me to go to paradise as part of the holy war, than to die at the hands of the police”. Moreover, as part of the fight against violent extremist groups, hundreds of people have also been arrested, most of them “on the basis of mere suspicions or denunciations motivated by inter-community hatred”, says a young girl from the commune of Kouandé.
Does this testimony reflect an individual opinion, or does it reflect a more general trend in northern Benin?
Numerous similar cases have been recorded by several associations for the defense of the Fulani community, notably Sudu Pulaku, Darjaa Pulaku, Sudu Baba, more specifically in the communes of Matéri, Dassari, Porga, Tanguieta and others.
“This situation weighed heavily in the decision of many young people in this community to join the enemy camp”, laments this young community mediator. Another young Fulani woman we met commented: “Given that some members of the Fulani community are persecuted by the forces of law and order, they say they prefer to join the jihadists.
They would feel safer there”. In this particular case, we find a typology of attractive factors in which feelings of insecurity and the desire for protection are combined. It is often in such situations that the security and defense forces become “part of the problem they were trying to solve”, as this teacher from Kérou testifies. For her, arbitrary or targeted arrests multiply after each attack, behind which “people always try to see the hand of the Fulbe”.
Anyway, given the urgency of the situation, tangible solutions are urgently needed to avoid increasing the threat to peace, security, and development in the region.
The major challenge is to improve the living conditions of these young people. The State’s military response to a phenomenon that has its roots in social, political, economic and community problems seems disproportionate.
It is crucial to recognize the risks of a further deterioration in the security situation in this part of Benin, and to provide appropriate and innovative solutions to ensure stability.